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Elliot Brown is a first year student at Yale Law School. 
Elliot Brown 
Radical Lawyers 
Their Role in the Movement and in the Courts 
Edited by Jonathan Black 
320 pp. New York 
Avon Books. Paper, $1.25 
Law Against the People 
Essays to Demystify Law, Order and the Courts 
Edited by Robert Lefcourt 
400 pp. New York 
Random House. Paper, $2.45 
Avast image springs to mind from the pages of Radical Lawyers and Law Against the People. 
A drab, somber, wood-paneled courtroom. On the 
bench sits Julius Hoffman, small, pinched, ornery and 
senile. Frederick Katzmann, fresh from his success 
putting away Sacco and Vanzetti for good, stands ready 
for the prosecution. Lining the back of the courtroom 
and filling the jury box, resplendent in baby-blue 
helmets and gas masks, mace in one hand and clubs in 
the other, the entire police department of the City of 
Chicago chants "Bomb Hanoi." Onto the scene strides 




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1972
398 
clenched, sneering contemptuously. 
The clerk intones, as clerks have done the memory of 
man runneth not to the contrary, "Oyez, oyez, oyez." 
The radical lawyer responds, "All power to the people. 
Off the pig. Free all political prisoners." The judge 
flinches and screams, "I think we should regard this 
action as a writ of mandamus, or maybe trover or 
replevin or trespass on case, but since I can't decide, I 
sentence defendent to an indeterminate sentence." 
The radical lawyer responds, quoting Marx, "This 
juridical illusion which reduces law to the mere will 
necessarily leads, in the further development of property 
relationships, to the position that a man may have a title 
to a thing without really having the thing." 
The prosecutor says, "The law is a seamless web," to 
which the radical lawyer responds, "The law is illegal." 
The police move in and clear the courtroom, the 
defendent is taken off to jail, and all the participants go 
home and write articles on the proceedings from their 
own particular perspectives. 
The trouble with the law, Radical Lawyers tells us, is 
that it is controlled by the rich and powerful. I was 
persuaded of that long before reading all 320 pages. 
(Those who weren't won't be even after.) I'm also 
persuaded the law is slow-moving and unresponsive to 
change. And another trouble, the lawyers say, is the 
mystique surrounding the law-a mystique which makes 
necessary a lawyer-priest who can guide the neophyte 
litigant through a situation in which he often has no 
chance anyway. I buy that assertion too. 
If so much is correct in these books, then where do 
they fail so terribly? They fail by refusing to recognize 
that the very words they use to "demystify" the law, 
their rhetoric of the revolution, is as unintelligible as 
that of the courts. It is difficult to imagine a welfare 
mother, deprived of her check without cause, responding 
any differently to the radical lawyer's explanation of 
"power elite" or "dialectic" than she would to the 
judge's decision on "declaratory relief' or "summary 
judgement." 
And the books fail by not telling us how we could go 
about getting that welfare mother her check. Most of the 
writers-lawyers like Stephen Wexler and William 
Kunstler, Henry di Suvero and Charles Garry-have 
demonstrated their expertise in just that sort of thing. 
And while, no doubt, these books make no claim to be 
"handbooks" for radical lawyers, they wind up instead 
being exercises in radical rhetoric which, to paraphrase a 
popular cartoon, "totally transcends a legal education." 
In their outrage at the legal system, the authors 
succumb to their emotions, at least in the books if not in 
court. That results in what radical lawyer and law 
professor Arthur Kinoy calls "radical-sounding, 
one-sided rhetoric, or fire and brimstone from another 
day and another age." In their eagerness to change the 
system the writers in these anthologies forget the men 
and women who cannot wait for the system to 
change-the men and women who need help now. 
This too-farsighted view reaches an extreme point in a 
story Wexler relates, apparently approvingly: 
The starkest way to paint a picture of the "proper" mentality 
for a poor people's lawyer is to relate a story which a very 
successful welfare rights organizer tells to illustrate his view of 
his role as an organizer: 
'I orice found a recipient who worked hard at organizing, and 
was particularly good in the initial stages of getting to talk to 
new people. I picked her up at her apartment one morning to go 
out knocking on doors. While I was there, I saw her child and I 
noticed that he seemed to be retarded. Because the boy ~is too 
young for school and the family never saw a doctor, the mother 
had never found out that something was seriously wrong with 
her son. I didn't tell her. If I had, she would have stopped 
working at welfare organizing to rush around looking for help 
for her son. I had some personal problems about doing that, but 
I'm an organizer, not a social worker.' 
Wexler continues to point out that while "a lawyer is 
not an organizer," lawyers working with poor people are 
apt to come across the same "personal problems." 
The question is how the statement, "I'm an organizer 
not a social worker," differs from the statement "I'm a 
businessman not a bank" (refusing credit to the poor), 
or "I run a factory not a kindergarten" (refusing to hire 
the unskilled). Is it because what the "organizer" is 
doing is so valuable that he can afford to sacrifice a child 
for it? Is it because businessmen or industrialists owe 
something to society which the organizer no longer 
owes? Is it because one child can not be allowed to stand 
in the way of the revolution? 
And what does "the revolution" mean? In "Law 
Against the People," Florence Kennedy rhapsodizes on 
"The Whorehouse Theory of Law." She concludes: 
"[M] y attempts [to use the law as a weapon against 
Establishment repression and against the system itself) 
have made me feel like I was trying to level the Pentagon 
with a wet noodle. I feel that the courts~nd the legal 
system are so thoroughly a part of the whole system of 
prosecution, persecution, and prostitution that an 
anti-Establishmentarian hustler like myself might be as 
well off simply using the law as a source of income, and 
disrupting the Establishment whenever my laziness and 
timidity permit. It's more fun that way. What's the 
revolution going to be for, if it's not going to bring more 
fun, anyway?" 
That is another question the books leave unanswered: 
what is the revolution going to be for? Why should 
anybody take the beatings and abuse these radical 
lawyers take? Why face the threat of professional 
censure and disbarment? Why live at subsistence level if 
the revolution is not going to "bring more fun?" Can we 
expect the same grimness that permeates so much of 
legal proceedings, so much of national policy, so much 
of life for the poor after "the revolution" as before? If 
so, why bother? 
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R adical rhetoric doesn't answer these . questions, it only broadly attacks the legal system as a whole. Arthur Kinoy, in attempting 
to explain the contradiction between being "radical" 
and being a "lawyer," says of his "radical colleagues at 
the bar:" "their frequently expressed formulation of 
their central role and objective as being that of 
'delegitimatizing' the institutions of the law is at once too 
narrow and too one-sided." Instead, says Kinoy, "the 
struggle to preserve the elementary forms of procedural 
guarantees, designed originally to protect individual 
liberty and the right to a fair trial, is not a struggle to 
'de/egitimatize' or 'demystify' these forms. The struggle is 
to defend these forms, to protect them; if you will, to 
legitimatize them against the efforts of the rulers to 
delegitimatize them." 
If we set aside, even accept Michael Kennedy's 
argument that the authors of the Bill of Rights-slave-
holders, aristocratic landholders, merchants and 
pirates-wrote the first ten amendments to protect 
"their class from the intrusion of such rabble as Tom 
Jefferson wanted to protect," it is still impossible to 
ignore the potentialities which the words themselves 
hold, the protections which, however abused, they offer. 
"[A] II of these rights and liberties read very well in 
the abstract," Kennedy says. "The problem is that the 
government-through a conspiracy of the executive, 
judicial, and legislative branches-defines what these 
rights and liberties mean and when they should be 
enforced." 
The function of t!ie radical lawyer should be to insure 
the enforcement of these rights and liberties and to fight 
government attempts to stifle them. "The movement," 
Henry di Suvero suggests, "has to understand that every 
case that comes to trial must be tried throughly, hard 
and well .... If the state knows a battle royal will ensue 
iri every political case, and that the state's legal 
reputation is likely to emerge bruised, tarnished and 
unvindicated, if the state knows that the uncelebrated if 
they are tried, will consume enormous amounts of tim'e 
and have an even better chance of emerging victorious, 
then fewer prosecutions will be commenced." 
The frustration evidenced when Kennedy calls the 
American Civil Liberties Union "paragovernmental," 
when Kenneth Cloke says "law has been accomplice to 
the greatest criminals, and should be sentenced to be 
hung by the neck until dead," and when Lefcourt 
entitles his book "Law Against the People," that kind of 
frustration simply is not an excuse for turning out so 
many words and so few suggestions. 
The books are most successful when the writers 
describe what can be done, and what is being done, 'in a 
practical sense. Frank Bardacke, a defendent in the 
Oakland 7 draft trial, describes the personalities and 
events which led to his acquittal. Charles Garry traces 
step-by-step the pretrial phases of the Huey Newton case 
in Oakland. And, in another vein, Brenda Fasteau 
describes the revolting and reprehensible excuses of law 
firms which discriminate against women. 
When Jonathan Black, in his introduction, notes that 
"Not every trial ... can be exploited politically. Very 
few can, and it is important to place ones energies where 
the return is potentially greatest," he, along with most 
of the other radical lawyers, makes an assumption as to 
what the "greatest return" is. In terms of revolution, the 
"greatest return" may well be the biggest headlines 
which awaken the most people to the particular cause. 
But in terms of immediate result, of preparation of the 
people for revolutionary change, and of waging a battle 
for fundamental liberties, the "greatest return" may 
come through an accumulation of small, day-by-day 
victories. If one's goal is the happiness of the people who 
are ~live now and can be helped now through the law, 
Black's sense of "greatest return" loses its validity. 
Brendan Behan, in no way a lawyer and in every way a 
radical, wrote in "Borstal Boy:" "I respect kindness to 
human beings first of all, and kindness to animals. I 
don't respect the law; I have a total irreverence for 
anything connected with society except that which 
makes the roads safer, the beer stronger, the food 
cheaper, and old men and women warmer in the winter 
and happier in the summer." 
It is difficult to believe that the same people who have 
devoted so much of their lives to radical causes can turn 
out books so corpulent with superficial criticism and so 
light on specific suggestion. Day after day they deal with 
the situation as it exists now. While it is pleasant to 
think upon the brighter day after the revolution, it 
seems there is important work to be done before the 
revolution-both in preparing for it and in surviving until 
it arrives. If this be playing into the hands of the power 
elite, so be it. But freedom for a poor man who can't 
make an unfair bail seems vastly preferable to a whole 
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